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IV 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the 
First District Court of Cache County, State of Utah, against the 
Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff for the balance claimed 
by Plaintiff to be owed on an open account and from an order of 
the First District Court denying Defendant's motion to set aside 
that summary judgment. 
This appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeal from 
the Utah Supreme Court. Jurisdiction lies with the Utah Court of 
Appeals by virtue of Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant specified in his appellant brief the issues to be 
presented for review by the Court of Appeals. The essence of the 
issues is satisfactorily stated such that Plaintiff deems it 
unnecessary to restate them and will address them in its arguments. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose from a claim by the Plaintiff against the 
Defendant on an open account upon which charges had been made 
for the purchase and delivery of lumber and building supplies. 
Legal action was initiated in the First Judicial District Court 
and some discovery made through Plaintiff's requests for 
admissions and interrogatories. The Defendant, represented by 
counsel, filed an answer and a response to those requests. Upon 
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the failure of the parties to resolve the matter by negotiations, 
Plaintitf moved for a summary judgment which Defendant did not 
oppose. Defendant filed no affidavits or other evidentiary 
materials. There being no response or opposition from the 
Defendant as to the motion for summary judgment, the District 
Court granted the summary judgment. Sometime thereafter, the 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal and a motion to set aside the 
summary judgment. The District Court denied the motion to set 
aside the summary judgment because of the appeal taken by the 
Defendant. The appeal had originally been to the Utah Supreme 
Court and was transferred by that court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Background 
Plaintiff is a Utah corporation engaged in the retail 
lumber and building supply business in Smithfield, Cache County, 
Utah. Defendant is engaged in the construction business in Cache 
County, Utah. 
On April 22, 1983, Defendant applied for and opened an open 
account with the Plaintiff for the purpose of purchasing lumber 
and building supplies. Purchases were made and the charges 
therefor posted against this open account until approximately 
March 11, 1985. (R.9) 
On or about March 15, 1985, Don C. Loosle, the father of the 
Defendant and the person the Defendant claims to be the true 
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debtor on this account, filed a petition in bankruptcy for relief 
under Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C., in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Utah, Bankruptcy Case. No. 85A00821 (R.53-57) 
2. Action Filed and Discovery 
On July 8, 1986, after unsuccessful attempts to obtain 
payment on the account and a settlement of the claim, Plaintiff 
filed a complaint against the Defendant for a judgment on the 
principal balance of the account, interest, costs, and reasonable 
attorney's fees. (R.l-3) 
Defendant filed his answer on July 18, 1986. (R.4-5) On 
August 8, 1986, Plaintitf filed and served a first request for 
inter rogator iess (R.8-12) (Exhibit A) on the Defendant to which 
the Defendant, through his legal counsel, filed a response (R.18-
23) (Exhibit D) in which the Defendant acknowledged that he was 
indebted to the Plaintitf for an amount of $750.00.(R.22) 
Plaintiff simultaneously with that request filed and served 
a first request for admissions on the Defendant (R.13-15) 
(Exhibit B) to which the Defendant, through his legal counsel, 
filed a response (R.16-17a) (Exhibit C) . 
3. Summary Judgment 
Plaintitf filed a motion for summary judgment on October 17, 
1986 (R.24-25) together with an affidavit in support of that 
motion (R.26-28) and a statement of points and authority (R.29-
34) . 
During the next four months, efforts were made between 
counsel for each party to negotiate and resolve the claim with 
those negotiations proving unsuccessful. Therefore, on January 
3 
22, 1987, P l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l r e q u e s t e d the D i s t r i c t Cour t t o a c t 
on P l a i n t i f f ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t w i t h a copy of t h e 
r e q u e s t l e t t e r be ing s e n t t o D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l . (R.35) 
D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t t i l e a r e s p o n s e o r o b j e c t i o n t o 
P l a i n t i f f ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t ; no r d i d he f i l e any 
a f f i d a v i t s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h a t m o t i o n ; nor d i d he r e s p o n d t o 
t h e e f f o r t s of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o e l i c i t a r e s p o n s e t o t h a t 
m o t i o n . On October 22, 2 3 , and 29, as w e l l a s on J a n u a r y 22, 23 , 
2 7 , and 28 t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a t t e m p t e d t o e l i c i t a r e s p o n s e from 
t h e Defendant t o which t h e Defendant made no r e p l y . A c c o r d i n g l y , 
on F e b r u a r y 3 , 1 9 8 7 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d a memorandum 
d e c i s i o n g r a n t i n g t h e m o t i o n ( R . 3 6 - 3 7 ) ( E x h i b i t E ) . I n 
a c c o r d a n c e wi th t h a t memorandum d e c i s i o n , a summary judgment was 
e n t e r e d on Feb rua ry 24, 1987 award ing a judgment t o t h e P l a i n t i f f 
a g a i n s t t h e D e f e n d a n t f o r t h e p r i n c i p a l amoun t of $ 1 1 , 8 7 6 . 1 8 
t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t a s of F e b r u a r y 2 8 , 1987 in t h e amoun t of 
$ 7 , 8 1 4 . 3 0 , c o s t s in t h e amoun t of $ 8 4 . 9 4 , and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s of 
$1,800.00 for a t o t a l judgment of $19,690.48 (R.40) ( E x h i b i t F) . 
4. N o t i c e of Appeal and Motion t o S e t As ide Summary Judgment 
Upon b e i n g s e r v e d w i t h a m o t i o n and o r d e r in s u p p l e m e n t a l 
p r o c e e d i n g s ( R . 4 2 - 4 4 ) , D e f e n d a n t , by and t h r o u g h new l e g a l 
c o u n s e l sough t and o b t a i n e d an ex p a r t e o r d e r e x t e n d i n g the t ime 
w i t h i n which t o f i l e a n o t i c e of a p p e a l t h r o u g h A p r i l 2 3 , 1 9 8 7 . 
(R.46-49) 
T h e r e a f t e r , on A p r i l 2 1 , 1987, in a s i m u l t a n e o u s and s i n g l e 
f i l i n g , D e f e n d a n t f i l e d a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e t h e summary 
j u d g m e n t (R .51-52) ( E x h i b i t G ) , t h e a f f i d a v i t of Don C. L o o s l e , 
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the father of the Defendant (R. 53-57), the affidavit of the 
Defendant (R.58-61), Defendant's memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of his motion to set aside the summary 
judgment (R.62-68) and a notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court (R. 69-70) (Exhibit H). 
Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's motion to set 
aside the summary judgment. (R.72-81) 
The District Court, because of the removal of the case from 
its jurisdiction by Defendant's appeal, entered a memorandum 
decision (R.82) (Exhibit I) denying the motion to set aside the 
summary judgment and entered a formal order denying the motion on 
July 8, 1987 (R.85) (Exhibit J). 
5. Motions For Summary Disposition 
Both parties filed motions with the Utah Supreme Court 
seeking summary disposition of the appeal. Plaintiff's motion 
was directed at the filing by the Defendant of his appeal in an 
improper court indicating that the matter should have been 
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. That motion was 
effectively resolved by the transfer of the appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals and the motion was accordingly denied. (R.86) 
Defendants motion for summary disposition was based on the 
same three points as set forth in his appellants brief which is 
now before this court. That motion for summary disposition was 
denied by the Utah Court of Appeals. (R.86) 
6. Issues of Appeal 
Defendant submitted his appellant's brief on or about 
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September 1, 1987, and ra i sed th ree i s sues on t h i s appeal : 
1. Did the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to en te r Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law make the judgment void? 
2. Are t h e r e f a c t u a l i s s u e s r a i s e d by the p l e a d i n g s and 
discovery such t h a t summary judgment was improper? 
3. Did the t r i a l c o u r t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by f a i l i n g 
to ru le upon the Defendant ' s Motion f i l ed pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
to Set Aside the Summary Judgment? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Utah Rules of C iv i l Procedure and the Federal Rules 
of C i v i l P rocedu re upon which they a r e based do not r e q u i r e the 
e n t r y of F i n d i n g s of Fac t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law for summary 
judgments or upon motions. Decis ions , including recent c a s e s , by 
the Utah Supreme C o u r t , o t h e r s t a t e c o u r t s , and the f e d e r a l 
cour t in cons t ru ing Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of C iv i l Procedure, 
Rule 52 of the F e d e r a l Rules of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , and s i m i l a r 
r u l e s of c i v i l p r o c e d u r e adopted by o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s based 
on Rule 52 of the Rules of C iv i l Procedure have c o n s i s t e n t l y held 
t h a t F i n d i n g s of Fac t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law a re not r e q u i r e d for 
summary judgments. 
2. Based on the p l e a d i n g s and the a f f i d a v i t b e f o r e i t and 
on the l ack of a r e s p o n s e from or o b j e c t i o n by the Defendant to 
P l a i n t i f f ' s motion for summary judgment , the D i s t r i c t Court 
proper ly found t h a t the re was no genuine issue of m a t e r i a l fac t 
and the P l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d on the bas i s of i t s a f f i d a v i t and 
p leadings to a summary judgment. Defendant does not c o n t e s t , nor 
r a i s e on appeal , the adequacy of P l a i n t i f f ' s motion or a f f i d a v i t 
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and seeks a reversal or setting aside of the summary judgment by 
the Utah Court of Appeals based on affidavits submitted by the 
Defendant significantly after the summary judgment had been 
entered. 
3. Upon the filing of his appeal, the Defendant effectively 
caused the removal of the matter from the jurisdiction of the 
district court and therefore the district court could not grant 
his motion to set aside the summary judgment. In any event, the 
Defendant sought an improper remedy in seeking to have the 
summary judgment set aside but rather should have sought an order 
amending the judgment, particularly in light of his admission of 
owing $750.00 on the claim, or some other more appropriate remedy. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. Response to Defendant's Point No. 1 
1. Defendant's Point. 
Defendant's first point on appeal is that pursuant to 
the decisions of the Utah State Supreme Court, the failure to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the judgment void 
the judgment matter. 
2. Plaintiff's Argument. 
Specific separate findings of fact and conclusions of law by 
the trial court or a court of original jurisdiction are not a 
requirement to the entry of an unopposed summary judgment. 
3. Common Law. 
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At common l a w , t h e f i n d i n g s of i s s u e s of f a c t by t h e c o u r t 
upon t h e e v i d e n c e was unknown and t h e r e f o r e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t for 
t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l aw mus t be b a s e d upon 
s t a t u t e s o r r u l e s d u l y a d o p t e d and in e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e of t h e 
j u d g m e n t . S e e 76 A m J u r . 2 n d , " T r i a l " , S e c t i o n 1252 and 
C a m p b e l l v . B o y r e a u , 62 U.S. 2 2 3 , 16 L.Ed. 9 6 . 
4 . Rule 5 2 . 
In t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , Ru le 52 of t h e Utah R u l e s of 
C i v i l P r o c e d u r e i s a p p l i c a b l e ( E x h i b i t K). S u b s e c t i o n (a) of 
s a i d Rule 52 p r o v i d e s , in p a r t : 
"In a l l a c t i o n s t r i e d upon the f a c t s w i t h o u t a 
j u r y or wi th an a d v i s o r y j u r y , t h e c o u r t s h a l l 
f ind the f a c t s s p e c i a l l y and s t a t e s e p a r a t e l y 
i t s c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w t h e r e o n , and j u d g m e n t 
s h a l l be e n t e r e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 8 A . . . " 
(emphas is added) 
T h i s r u l e s p e c i f i c a l l y a p p l i e s o n l y t o a c t i o n s t r i e d upon 
t h e f a c t s . In t h e c a s e on a p p e a l b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , t h e m a t t e r 
was n o t t r i e d and t h e r e f o r e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of Ru le 52 f o r 
f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law d id n o t a p p l y . S e e 76 
Am.Jur 2nd, " T r i a l " , S e c t i o n 1252 a t Page 203: 
"Where t h e r e i s no c o n t e s t a s t o t h e f a c t s , 
f i n d i n g s need no t be made." 
Rule 52(a) a l s o p r o v i d e s : 
"The t r i a l c o u r t need not e n t e r f i n d i n g s of f a c t 
and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w in r u l i n g s on m o t i o n s 
e x c e p t as p rov ided in Rule 41(b) ." 
P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a m o t i o n which t h e c o u r t r u l e d upon and Ru le 
41(b) p r o v i d e s no e x c e p t i o n for t h i s c a s e . 
B a s i c a l l y , t h e e n t r y of f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of 
l a w a r e r e q u i r e d where t h e r e ha s been a d i s p u t e a s t o t h e f a c t s 
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or where con t ra ry evidence has been placed before the c o u r t . 
In the ca se b e f o r e the c o u r t a t t h i s t i m e , t he ev idence was 
u n c o n t r o v e r t e d . P l a i n t i f f s u b m i t t e d an a f f i d a v i t in s u p p o r t of 
i t s mot ion for summary judgment and no c o u n t e r - a f f i d a v i t or 
e v i d e n t i a r y m a t e r i a l of any kind was produced bythe Defendant. 
Findings of fac t and conclus ions of law are not e s s e n t i a l to 
i s sues unsupported by any m a t e r i a l evidence. See 76 Am. Ju r . 2d, 
" T r i a l " , S e c t i o n 1253; Weissbaum v. Hannon, (1977, DC 111), 439 
F. Supp. 873; and In Re: Uranium A n t i t r u s t L i t i g a t i o n , (1979, ND 
111), 473 F. Supp. 382. 
5. Waiver. 
The f a i l u r e to submit c o u n t e r - a f f i d a v i t s or evidence may in 
f a c t c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of t he n e c e s s i t y for t h e making of 
f indings of fac t or conclus ions of law by the D i s t r i c t Court. See 
Rule 52(c)(1) Utah Rules of C iv i l Procedure, which would suggest 
t h a t the f a i l u r e to appear in r e s p o n s e to the mot ion might con-
s t i t u t e a waiver by the Defendant as to the i s s u e s of f a c t . See 
a l s o , 76 Am.Jur.2nd "Tr i a l " , Sect ion 1252, a t Page 203: 
"The p a r t i e s may waive the making of 
f indings of fac t by the c o u r t , e i t h e r 
express ly or impl ied ly , even though a 
s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s f indings to be made." 
6. Utah Supreme Court . 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled with respect to summary 
judgments on the issue of whether or not the trial court is 
required to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
Mountain State Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Atkin Wright, and 
Miles et.al., 681 P. 2d 1958 (Utah, 1984). (Exhibit M) The 
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court in that case specifically considered the application of 
Rule 52 as to the matter of a summary judgment and clearly and 
pointedly held: 
"Findings of fact are unnecessary to support 
the granting of summary judgment." 
This then is the prevailing rule in the State of Utah and 
addresses the issue directly as opposed to the three cases cited 
by the Defendant in his brief. 
7. Defendant's Cited Cases. 
In all three cases cited by the Defendant in his brief, the 
facts and procedures are all immediately distinguishable from the 
current case before this Court. Specifically, in each of those 
cases, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment 
provided evidentiary material, affidavits, or depositions and 
appeared in either hearings or trials in active opposition to the 
motion such that conflicting evidence or facts were before the 
trial courts requiring findings to be made of record., In our 
case, the Defendant filed no such affidavits, presented no 
admissible evidentiary materials, and made no active opposition 
nor any request for an appearance in any hearing or trial. There 
simply was no conflicting evidence before the court in this case. 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff argues that no findings of 
fact were required and the summary judgment is thus valid and 
should be affirmed. 
II. Response to Defendant's Point No. 2 
1. Defendant's Point. 
Defendant's second point that is on appeal is that summary 
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judgment is valid only if there are no factual issues and the 
Plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
2. P l a i n t i f f ' s Argument. 
Defendant f a i l e d to f i l e a f f i d a v i t s in o p p o s i t i o n to the 
motion of the P l a i n t i f f for a summary judgment or to chal lenge 
the su f f i c iency of the a f f i d a v i t submitted by the P l a i n t i f f and 
the re fo re the d i s t r i c t cour t proper ly granted the motion. More-
o v e r , n e i t h e r in h i s answer to the c o m p l a i n t nor in h i s answers 
and responses did the Defendant r a i s e genuine i s sues of m a t e r i a l 
fac t s u f f i c i e n t to deny the summary judgment. 
The summary judgmen t , be ing v a l i d l y e n t e r e d , should be 
aff i rmed. 
3. Defendant ' s F a i l u r e to F i l e A f f i d a v i t s . 
Case law q u i t e c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t i f no a f f i d a v i t s or 
other e v i d e n t i a r y m a t e r i a l s are provided in oppos i t ion to a motion 
for summary judgment and i f t h a t mot ion and accompanying 
a f f i d a v i t s are s u f f i c i e n t a summary judgment i s appropr ia te and 
r e q u i r e d . In the c a s e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , the Defendant f i l e d no 
a f f i d a v i t s or e v i d e n t i a r y m a t e r i a l s , d e s p i t e the r e q u e s t of the 
cour t and no t i ce of the motion, p r io r to the time the memorandum 
dec i s ion and summary judgment were en te red . The a f f i d a v i t s f i l ed 
by the Defendant were f i l e d two months a f t e r the e n t r y of the 
memorandum dec i s ion and summary judgment and in support of the 
Defendant ' s motion to s e t as ide the summary judgment. (R.53-61). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Frankl in F inanc i a l v. New Empire 
Development Company, 659 P. 2d 1040, (Utah 1983) , a f f i r m e d t h e 
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e n t r y of a summary judgment in the f o r e c l o s u r e of a c o n t r a c t and 
for a d e b t on a p r o m i s s o r y no te and s t a t e d a t Page 1044: 
"Thus , when a p a r t y opposes a p r o p e r l y s u p p o r t e d 
m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t and f a i l s t o f i l e 
any r e s p o n s i v e a f f i d a v i t o r o t h e r e v i d e n t i a r y 
m a t e r i a l s a l l o w e d by Rule 5 6 ( e ) , t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
may p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e a r e no genu ine 
i s s u e s of f a c t u n l e s s t h e face of t h e movan t " s 
a f f i d a v i t a f f i r m a t i v e l y d i s c l o s e s the e x i s t e n c e 
of s u c h an i s s u e . W i t h o u t s u c h a s h o w i n g , t h e 
c o u r t need on ly d e c i d e w h e t h e r , on the b a s i s of 
a p p l i c a b l e l a w , t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d to 
j udgmen t . " 
The Utah Supreme C o u r t ha s made s i m i l a r r u l i n g s in o t h e r 
c a s e s i n c l u d i n g Ence v. J o h n s o n , 551 P.2d 228 (Utah 1 9 7 6 ) ; 
O l w e l l v . C l a r k , 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ; and F r i s b e e v . K & K 
C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . See a l s o 73 Am. 
J u r . 2 d , "Summary J u d g m e n t , " S e c t i o n 22 ; 2 A.L.R. 3rd 1144 ; Read 
v. D a v i s , 399 P.2d 338 (WA 1 9 6 5 ) ; and E.O. D o r s c h E l e c t r i c Co. 
v . P l a z a C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, 413 S.W.2d 167 (MO 19 ) . 
4 . Purpose for R e q u i r i n g O p p o s i t i o n A f f i d a v i t s . 
The p u r p o s e f o r r e q u i r i n g a p a r t y o p p o s i n g a m o t i o n f o r 
summary judgment has been s t a t e d by the Washington Supreme Cour t 
i n
 Read v . D a v i s , 399 P.2d 338 (WA 1965) a t Page 343 : 
"The whole pu rpose of summary p r o c e d u r e would be 
d e f e a t e d i f a c a s e c o u l d be f o r c e d t o t r i a l by 
a mere a s s e r t i o n t h a t an i s s u e e x i s t s w i t h o u t 
any showing of e v i d e n c e . " 
I n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t c o u r t a l s o held t h a t a summary judgment 
was p rope r u n l e s s t h e opponent showed t h a t r e l a t e d e v i d e n c e was 
a v a i l a b l e which would j u s t i f y a t r i a l on the i s s u e . 
The Ar izona Supreme C o u r t , in Lujan v. M a c m u r t r i e , 383 P.2d 
187 (AZ 1 9 6 3 ) , a t Page 190, s t a t e d : 
" . . . t h e c o u r t w i l l n o t n o r m a l l y l o o k w i t h 
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i n d u l g e n c e upon a p a r t y who has p r e s e n t e d 
ne i the r e v i d e n t i a r y m a t e r i a l s in oppos i t ion nor 
any reason for h is f a i l u r e to do s o . " 
I m p l i c i t in t h e s e and tne fo rego ing c a s e s as we l l as Rule 
52, and P l a i n t i f f so acknowledges , i s the need for the moving 
p a r t y to f i l e an a f f i d a v i t which t o g e t h e r wi th a p p l i c a b l e law 
e n t i t l e s the movant to judgment even if the opponent does not so 
f i l e . Some j u r i s d i c t i o n s by s t a t u t e provide t ha t the opponent ' s 
f a i l u r e to f i l e alone r e q u i r e s the en t ry of the summary judgment, 
but P l a i n t i f f does not here make t h a t argument. 
5. Defendant ' s Averments Alone Are I n s u f f i c i e n t . 
I t i s not s u f f i c i e n t for the Defendant to simply deny claims 
e i t h e r in h is answer to the complaint or in h is responses to the 
P l a i n t i f f ' s r eques t s for admissions or i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . See, for 
example, 73 Am.Jur.2d, "Summary Judgment," Sect ion 22 a t Page 744 
where i t i s s t a t e d : 
" F e d e r a l Rule 56 and s i m i l a r s t a t e r u l e s 
s t i p u l a t e t h a t when a m o t i o n fo r summary 
judgment i s made and s u p p o r t e d as p rov ided in 
such r u l e s , an a d v e r s e p a r t y may not r e s t upon 
the mere a l l e g a t i o n s or d e n i a l s of h is p lead ing , 
bu t h i s r e s p o n s e , by a f f i d a v i t or as o t h e r w i s e 
p rov ided in such r u l e , must s e t f o r t h s p e c i f i c 
f ac t s showing tha t the re i s a genuine i ssue for 
t r i a l , and t h a t i f he d o e s n o t so r e s p o n d , 
summary judgmen t , i f a p p r o p r i a t e , s h a l l be 
entered aga ins t him" 
and 
"It is not enough that one opposing the motion 
for summary judgment claims that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact; some evidence 
showing the existence of such an issue must be 
presented in the counter affidavits. In other 
words, in order to show a triable issue of facts 
so as to defeat a motion for summary judgment, 
mere general averments will not suffice, since 
an evidentiary showing is indispensable." 
13 
See a l s o S e a s o n A l l I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . v. M e r c h a n t S h i p p e r s 
(DC Pa) 417 F. Supp . 9 9 8 ; G o l d e n O i l Co. v . Exxon C o . , U.S.A. (CA 
5 LA) 543 F.2D 548; C i t i z e n s I n s . Co. v . B u r k e s (Ohio 1 9 7 8 ) , 381 
N.E.2d 9 6 3 ; and A n d e r s o n v. V i k i n g Pump D i v . , (CA 8 I o w a ) , 545 
F.2d 1127 . 
6. P l a i n t i f f ' s A f f i d a v i t U n c h a l l e n g e d ; Presumed T r u e . 
The D e f e n d a n t in t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t had t h e o p t i o n 
t o c h a l l e n g e t h e a f f i d a v i t of t h e P l a i n t i f f and d i d n o t do s o . 
He c o u l d have moved t o s t r i k e t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s a f f i d a v i t and h i s 
f a i l u r e t o do so i s a waiver of o p p o s i t i o n to i t . 
The Utah Supreme Cour t in F r a n k l i n F i n a n c i a l v. New Empire 
Development Company c i t e d above a d d r e s s e d t h i s a t Page 1044: 
" F u r t h e r m o r e , i f , on a m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y 
j u d g m e n t , an o p p o s i n g p a r t y f a i l s t o move t o 
s t r i k e d e f e c t i v e a f f i d a v i t s , he i s deemed t o 
h a v e w a i v e d h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o w h a t e v e r 
e v i d e n t i a r y d e f e c t s may e x i s t . " 
L i k e w i s e , in t h a t same d e c i s i o n , the c o u r t held t h a t i f the 
s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e m o v a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t i s no t r a i s e d b e f o r e the 
t r i a l c o u r t , t h e n i t c a n n o t be so r a i s e d upon a p p e a l . In our 
c a s e , t h e D e f e n d a n t h a s n e i t h e r moved t o s t r i k e nor r a i s e d t h e 
q u e s t i o n of the s u f f i c i e n c y of the P l a i n t i f f ' s a f f i d a v i t and so 
i t i s no t a t i s s u e . 
T h e r e i s a u t h o r i t y a l s o t h a t i f an a f f i d a v i t f i l e d in 
s u p p o r t of a mot ion for summary judgment i s no t c o n t r o v e r t e d then 
t h e f a c t s s e t f o r t h in t h a t a f f i d a v i t m u s t be p r e s u m e d t o be t r u e 
and t h e f a i l u r e of an o p p o n e n t t o f i l e any c o u n t e r - a f f i d a v i t or 
p r e s e n t any proof and r e s p o n s e to the mot ion for summary judgment 
f o r c e s t h e c o u r t t o a c c e p t a s t r u e t h a t no f a c t u a l i s s u e e x i s t e d . 
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See 73 Am.Jur.2d, "Summary Judgment," Sect ion 20. 
In Eastwood E l e c t r i c Company v. R.L. Branaman C o n t r a c t o r , 
432 P.2d 139 (AZ 1967) , the Ar izona Supreme Cour t s t a t e d a t Page 
143: 
" . . .where f a c t s a r e s e t f o r t h in an a f f i d a v i t , 
in support of a motion for summary judgment, and 
s a i d f a c t s a r e n o t c o n t r o v e r t e d , t h e y a r e 
presumed to be t r u e . " 
That c o u r t then held i t mandatory for a t r i a l c o u r t to e n t e r 
a summary judgment if the opposing did not f i l e an a f f i d a v i t and 
the movant otherwise e n t i t l e d by law to a judgment. 
7 . Defendant Raised No Issue of Fac t . 
The only sources of evidence before the d i s t r i c t cour t which 
were p rov ided by the Defendant a t the t ime of t he mot ion for 
summary judgment and the en t ry of the memorandum dec i s ion and the 
summary judgment i t s e l f were in h is answer to the complaint and 
h i s r e s p o n s e s t o P l a i n t i f f ' s r e q u e s t fo r a d m i s s i o n s and 
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the Defendant f i l e d no a f f i d a v i t s 
u n t i l the f i l i n g of h i s motion to s e t as ide the summary judgment 
two months a f t e r the summary judgment. 
As s t a t e d above , P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s t h a t the D e f e n d a n t ' s 
answer to the c o m p l a i n t i s not e v i d e n c e such as to r a i s e i s s u e s 
in prevent ion of a summary judgment nor are responses to reques t s 
for admissions or i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . 
However, a review of those responses , not withstanding any 
l ega l arguments, shows t h a t no genuine i s sues were ra i sed in any 
event . F i r s t and foremost, no where in those responses does the 
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D e f e n d a n t a l l e g e o r c l a i m t h a t t h e d e b t i s in f a c t t h e d e b t of 
h i s f a t h e r and n o t h i s . The c l o s e s t t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t came t o 
making such a c l a i m , and to which he r e f e r s in h i s b r i e f , i s h i s 
answer to I n t e r r o g a t o r y No. 7 ( R . 2 0 - 2 1 ) . 
In r e s p o n s e to an i n q u i r y c o n c e r n i n g h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h i s 
f a t h e r ' s p r o j e c t for which much of t h e lumber and m a t e r i a l s was 
s u p p l i e d unde r t h e s u b j e c t a c c o u n t , t h e D e f e n d a n t s i m p l y s a i d 
t h a t t h e p r o j e c t was " a d m i n i s t e r e d " by h i s f a t h e r who r e t a i n e d 
and pa id him. In and of i t s e l f , t h a t r a i s e s no i s s u e s r e g a r d i n g 
t h e o b l i g a t i o n on t h e a c c o u n t . 
The o n l y o t h e r p o s s i b l e c l a i m t h a t an i s s u e was r a i s e d was 
i n t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s r e s p o n s e t o I n t e r r o g a t o r y No. 1 2 . (R .22) . 
T h e r e t h e D e f e n d a n t in a n s w e r i n g an i n q u i r y a b o u t any n o t i c e 
h a v i n g b e e n g i v e n t o t h e P l a i n t i f f of t h e a c c o u n t n o t b e i n g due 
t o P l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t e d a h e r e s a y s t a t e m e n t a t t r i b u t e d t o h i s 
f a t h e r . Even i f a d m i s s i b l e , which i t would not be because of i t s 
h e a r s a y n a t u r e , t he s t a t e m e n t me re ly was t h a t the m a t e r i a l s were 
t o be p u r c h a s e d and s u p p l i e d t o t h e p r o j e c t fo r t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s 
f a t h e r . A g a i n , t h i s i s n o t t h e r a i s i n g of a f a c t u a l i s s u e . 
N o t h i n g in i t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e a c c o u n t was n o t t h a t of t h e 
D e f e n d a n t . D e f e n d a n t ' s b r i e f , a t Page 5, d o e s n o t a c c u r a t e l y 
i n d i c a t e t he a c t u a l r e s p o n s e of t h e Defendant a s i n d i c a t e d in the 
r e c o r d . 
I t i s a commonly known p r a c t i c e for c o n t r a c t o r s t o p u r c h a s e 
m a t e r i a l s on t h e i r own a c c o u n t s for d e l i v e r y and use a t p r o j e c t 
s i t e s f o r p r o j e c t s on which t h e y a r e w o r k i n g unde r a c o n t r a c t 
wi th t h e p r o p e r t y owner . Again , t h a t r a i s e s no i s s u e of t r i a b l e 
f a c t in our c a s e . 
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Regarding the i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the h e r e s a y s t a t e m e n t , See 
73 Am.Jur.2d, "Summary J u d g m e n t / ' S e c t i o n 22; Doff v. Brunswick 
C o r p o r a t i o n , (CA 9 Ca l ) 372 P.2d 8 0 1 ; and A d i c k e s v . S.H. K r e s s 
& Company, 398 U.S. 1 4 4 , 26 L.ED.2D 1 4 2 , 90 S.Ct . 1 5 9 8 . 
D e f e n d a n t d i d , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , make a d m i s s i o n s in h i s 
r e s p o n s e s t o P l a i n t i f f ' s r e q u e s t f o r a d m i s s i o n s a n d 
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s which s u p p o r t the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n . As 
t o t h e r e q u e s t for a d m i s s i o n s , t h e Defendant a d m i t t e d t h a t the 
m a t e r i a l s were p u r c h a s e d and d e l i v e r e d on t h e a c c o u n t (R .17) ; 
t h a t h i s f a t h e r , Don C. L o o s l e , was a u t h o r i z e d t o make p u r c h a s e 
a g a i n s t the accoun t (R.17); and t h a t the Defendant knew t h a t h i s 
f a t h e r was mak ing c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h a t a c c o u n t and t h a t t h e 
Defendant made no o b j e c t i o n s t o t hose c h a r g e s (R.17). 
In h i s r e s p o n s e t o t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , t he Defendant never 
s t a t e d or c l a i m e d t h a t t h e a c c o u n t was r e a l l y t h a t of h i s f a t h e r ; 
never d e n i e d t h a t t h e accoun t was h i s ; never den ied t h a t c h a r g e s 
were made a g a i n s t i t ; n e v e r c h a l l e n g e d t h e c h a r g e s ; and n e v e r 
d e n i e d t h a t t h e r e was an o u t s t a n d i n g b a l a n c e due on i t . At t h e 
s a m e t i m e , t h e D e f e n d a n t d i d a d m i t t h a t t h e r e w e r e no 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e a c c o u n t (R .21) ; t h a t no p a y m e n t s had been 
made on t h e a c c o u n t (R .21) ; and t h a t he was i n d e b t e d on t h e 
a c c o u n t f o r $750.00 (R .22 ) . 
8 . D e f e n d a n t ' s Admit ted D e b t . 
The D e f e n d a n t in r e s p o n s e t o I n t e r r o g a t o r y No. 13 (R.7) 
a d m i t t e d a d e b t of $ 7 5 0 . 0 0 , and t h a t r e s p o n s e was a v a l i d b a s i s 
t h e n f o r t h e i s s u a n c e of a summary j u d g m e n t . D e f e n d a n t ' s 
a r g u m e n t a t b e s t , t h e r e f o r e , i s t h e amoun t of t h e j u d g m e n t and 
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not the v a l i d i t y of the j udgmen t . Because t h e r e was e v i d e n c e 
before the d i s t r i c t cour t t h a t the amount of $19,690.48 was owed 
and such e v i d e n c e was u n c o n t r o v e r t e d , the c o u r t a p p a r e n t l y 
entered the summary judgment. 
9. Record Before D i s t r i c t Cour t . 
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t had b e f o r e i t , as a m a t t e r of r e c o r d , 
f a c t s which were more than s u f f i c i e n t for t he g r a n t i n g of a 
summary judgment and had no evidence before i t adequate to r a i s e 
a genu ine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t s such t h a t t h e g r a n t i n g of a. 
summary judgment would have been i n a p p r o p r i a t e . 
10. After-filed Affidavits. 
The a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d by the Defendan t , t o g e t h e r wi th h i s 
motion to s e t as ide the summary judgment, were f i l ed two months 
a f t e r t h e e n t r y of t h e summary j u d g m e n t . In e f f e c t , t h e 
Defendant i s seeking on t h i s appeal to have the summary judgment 
s e t a s i d e , not based on the r eco rd be fo re the c o u r t a t the t ime 
the summary judgment was e n t e r e d , bu t on a f f i d a v i t s p rov ided 
l a t e r . Nothing contained in the l a t e r a f f i d a v i t s was j n a v a i l a b l e 
to the Defendant a t the time the memorandum dec i s ion and summary 
judgment were en te red , nor does Defendant claim tha t they include 
newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e . Rule 56(f) ( E x h i b i t L) a d d r e s s e s 
d i r e c t l y the c i rcumstances where a f f i d a v i t s are unava i l ab le and 
provides very s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t the opposing par ty may seek and 
the c o u r t may o r d e r a c o n t i n u a n c e to p e r m i t a f f i d a v i t s t o be 
o b t a i n e d or d e p o s i t i o n s to be t aken or d i s c o v e r y to be had or 
make such o t h e r o r d e r as i s j u s t . In t h i s c a s e , the Defendant 
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made no such p r o f f e r , sought no such r e l i e f or c o n t i n u a n c e , and 
made no oppos i t ion to the motion for summary judgment. 
1 1 , Cases Cited by the Defendant, 
N e i t h e r of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s c i t e d c a s e s a d d r e s s t h e 
c i rcumstances in t h i s ma t t e , i e . the r i g h t of a defendant to have 
a summary judgment se t as ide based on a f f i d a v i t s submitted by him 
a f t e r the en t ry of judgment. In Freder ick May & Company v. Dunn, 
d e p o s i t i o n s had been taken and a fac tua l d i spu te ra i sed p r io r to 
the summary judgment. In Union Bank v. Swenson, a f f i d a v i t s had 
been f i l e d , the summary judgment a c t i v e l y opposed, and hear ings 
held p r io r to the issuance of summary judgment. 
12. Comments in Support of Arguments. 
I t must be noted a l s o in t h i s ca se t h a t the Defendant does 
not argue t h a t the P l a i n t i f f ' s a f f i d a v i t and p l e a d i n g s were 
i n s u f f i c i e n t for the gran t ing of a summary judgment or t h a t the 
c o u r t would be l a w f u l l y p r o h i b i t e d from e n t e r i n g a summary 
judgment on t h a t a f f i d a v i t . Defendant 's argument, as i nd ica t ed , 
i s p r e d i c a t e d on the b a s i s t h a t f a c t u a l i s s u e s were r a i s e d in 
a f f i d a v i t s submit ted a f t e r the judgment and t h a t by some fashion 
t h i s s u b m i s s i o n v o i d s the summary judgment . This n a t u r a l l y i s 
c o n t r a r y t o c a s e l aw , r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e and the c o n c e p t of 
f a i r n e s s , j u d i c i a l economy, and order if a judgment might be se t 
as ide a t any point simply because a given defendant decides a f t e r 
j u d g m e n t t o e v e n t u a l l y r e s p o n d w i t h c o u n t e r - a f f i d a v i t s . 
P l a i n t i f f should not be penal ized by the lack of due d i l i g e n c e by 
the Defendant. 
F i n a l l y , i t i s a l so r e a d i l y apparent in t h i s mat ter t h a t the 
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D e f e n d a n t i s a t t e m p t i n g to s h i f t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y from t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n to h i s f a t h e r who i s in b a n k r u p t c y . This p r e s e n t s 
obvious concerns to the P l a i n t i f f and would s e r i o u s l y damage i t s 
i n t e r e s t s . 
P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s t h a t the summary judgment was p r o p e r l y 
entered and should be af f i rmed. 
I l l . Response to Defendant ' s Poin t No.3 
1 . Defendant ' s P o i n t . 
Defendant ' s t h i r d poin t on appeal s t a t e s t h a t the f a i l u r e of 
the t r i a l cour t to i ssue a ru l ing on the Defendant ' s 60(b) motion 
i s grounds for summary r e v e r s a l of the a c t i o n . 
2 . P l a i n t i f f ' s Argument. 
By filing his appeal, the defendant caused the matter to be 
removed from the jurisdiction of the district court and in effect 
withdrew that motion because the points of appeal are essentially 
the same as raised in the motion. 
The Court of Appeals ruling on the first two issues raised 
in this appeal will render the motion to set aside moot. 
3 . Simultaneous F i l i n g . 
As the r eco rd i n d i c a t e s , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and as a p a r t of 
the same f i l i n g , Defendant on Apr i l 21, 1987, f i l ed h i s motion to 
se t as ide the summary judgment. (R. 51-52); the a f f i d a v i t of Don 
C. Loos le (R. 53 -57 ) ; t he a f f i d a v i t of t he Defendant (R.58-61) 
and Defendant ' s memorandum of po in t s and a u t h o r i t i e s , (R.62-68), 
and h i s n o t i c e of a p p e a l (R.69-70) . Having p r e v i o u s l y o b t a i n e d 
an ex par te order extending time within which to f i l e the no t i ce 
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of appea l (R.46-49) , the Defendant was wel l aware of the f i l i n g 
of h i s i n t e n t to f i l e t he n o t i c e of a p p e a l . In h i s b r i e f , 
Defendant suggests t h a t because i t was unclear whether or not a 
m o t i o n f i l e d under Ru le 60(b) of t h e Utah R u l e s of C i v i l 
P rocedu re s t ayed the t ime for a p p e a l , the Defendant a l s o f i l e d 
h i s no t i ce of appea l . 
4. Divestment of J u r i s d i c t i o n . 
The f i l i n g of a n o t i c e of appea l i n i t i a t e s the a p p e l l a t e 
process and immediately, as to the i s sues on appeal , removes the 
matter from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t . 
The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t an a p p e a l , when du ly p e r f e c t e d , 
d i v e s t s the t r i a l c o u r t of i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n and t r a n s f e r s t h a t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t where i t r ema ins u n t i l the 
a p e l l a t e p roceed ing t e r m i n a t e s and the t r i a l c o u r t r e g a i n s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . See 4 Am.Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error" Sect ion 352. 
In t ha t same s e c t i o n , a t page 831 i t i s s t a t ed t h a t : 
"Having l o s t j u r i s d i c t i o n pending an appeal , the 
lower c o u r t may not proceed wi th the t r i a l . . . o r 
e n t e r t a i n a b i l l to r e v i e w t h e judgment . A 
t r i a l cour t amy not enter a motion to d i smiss a 
pending a p p e a l . . . " 
S u b s e q u e n t l y , a t Page 832 in S e c t i o n 353, the same s o u r c e 
s t a t e s : 
"The a p p e l l a t e c o u r t h a v i n g o b t a i n e d 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c a s e , the t r i a l c o u r t i s 
o r d i n a r i l y without power to open, vaca te , or s e t 
as ide the order or judgment appealed from." 
Case l aw, i n c l u d i n g d e c i s i o n s of the Utah Supreme Cour t , 
support t h i s p r i n c i p l e . See for example Smith v. Kimball , 289 P. 
588 (Utah); Lane v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333 (Utah, 1984); J u l i a n v. 
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Buckley, 625 P.2d 526 (MT, 1981); Hadford v. Hadford 615 P.2d 920 
(MT, 1980); Tracy v, University of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340 
(Utah, 1980); Associated Lumber & Box Company v. Superior Court 
in and for Calaveras County, 180 P.2d 389 (CA-3dCa, 1947); 
Berman v. U.S., 302 U.S. 211, 82 L.Ed.204, 58 S.Ct 164; 
Peterson v. Peterson, 292 P.2d 130 (Oregon, 1956); Benolken v. 
Miracle, 273 P.2d 667 (MT, 1954); and State v. Jackson, 365 P.2d 
294 (Oregon, 1961). 
The Montana cour t in Benolken v. Miracle s t a t ed at Page 669: 
"When the no t i ce of appeal from the judgment was 
served and f i l e d , j u r i s d i c t i o n over the p a r t i e s 
t o t h e c o n t r o v e r s y and t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r 
t h e r e o f passed from the d i s t r i c t c o u r t and 
vested in t h i s c o u r t . " 
I n
 S t a t e v. J a c k s o n , t he Oregon Supreme Court a t Page 299 
s t a t e d : 
"It is a well settled rule that after 
jurisdiction has been vested in an appellate 
court by the taking of an appeal, the lower 
court cannot proceed in any manner so as to 
affect the jurisdiction required by bhe 
appellate court or defeat the right of the 
appellant to prosecute the appeal with effect." 
It might be noted also that it is the filing of the appeal, 
not the entering of final judgment, that divests the District 
Court of jurisdiction. See Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 
568 P.2d. 1166 (1978 - CA 5 LA); Burke v. Burke, 336 So.2d 1237. 
As to whether or not the district court would have had any 
discretion in the matter, it has also been held that if the 
district court has any doubt or concerns on whether or not the 
notice of appeal is inoperative it may decline to act further 
until the purported appellee obtains dismissal of the appeal in 
the court of appeals. See Ruby v. Secretary of the United States 
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Navy, 365 F.2d 385 (CA 9-CAL). 
Having no j u r i s d i c t i o n , the d i s t r i c t c o u r t would not have 
been a b l e t o p r o p e r l y h e a r and make a d e c i s i o n upon t h e 
D e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion to s e t a s i d e the summary judgment . In the 
absence of a u t h o r i t y and j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e r e f u s a l of t he 
d i s t r i c t cour t to ru le upon the Defendant ' s motion to se t as ide 
the summary judgmen t , could not p o s s i b l y have c o n s t i t u t e d 
manifest e r r o r . 
5. Defendant Seeks Improper Be l i e f . 
As s t a t e d in the fo rego ing a r g u m e n t s , the Defendant had 
admit ted a debt of $750.00 and the re fo re a summary judgment was 
appropr ia te aga ins t the Defendant for a t l e a s t t h a t amount. The 
t r u e i s s u e became a t t h a t p o i n t what the amount of judgment 
should be and not whether or not judgment should be e n t e r e d a t 
a l l . The Defendant d id not f i l e a mot ion to amend the judgment 
or to seek such o t h e r r e l i e f as might have been a v a i l a b l e to 
him, but r a t h e r sought to appea l t he judgment on the b a s i s t h a t 
i t had been entered as a mat ter of manifest e r r o r . There i s no 
p r o v i s i o n a t law or in the Rules of C i v i l P rocedure for the 
s e t t i n g as ide of a summary judgment simply because of subsequent 
a l l e g a t i o n s of the e x i s t e n c e of a m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e . The 
Defendant had h i s o p p o r t u n i t y for o p p o s i t i o n to the mot ion to 
summary judgment and did not so oppose. I t would be con t ra ry to 
the concepts of f a i r n e s s and the p r i n c i p l e s of the Rules of C iv i l 
P rocedure to a l l o w any d e f e n d a n t to c l a i m m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e s 
a f t e r a judgment has been entered when such defenses were r e a d i l y 
a v a i l a b l e p r io r to t h a t judgment. 
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P l a i n t i f f , having made every e f f o r t to provide the proper ty 
no t ice and p leadings to the Defendant, and having re f ra ined from 
pursing the summary judgment for over three months, should not be 
penal ized for the Defendant ' s lack of response and oppos i t ion to 
the motion for summary judgment. 
Defendant a r g u e s in s u p p o r t of h i s t h i r d p o i n t t h a t a 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t c anno t a c t a r b i t r a r i l y in t he d e n i a l of a mot ion 
to s e t a s i d e a judgment . P l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s t h a t the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s a s s e r t i o n of l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n i s not an a r b i t r a r y 
a c t . 
6. F a i l u r e to communicate between counsel and c l i e n t i s not 
excusable n e g l e c t . 
Defendant did not r a i s e t h i s issue on appeal but i n f e r s t h a t 
i t i s a b a s i s for d e t e r m i n i n g m a n i f e s t e r r o r by t h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t . The Defendant sugges ts t h a t the re was excusable neg lec t 
under Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of C iv i l Procedure because of the 
l ack of communica t ion between the Defendant and h i s f i r s t 
counse l . 
This s u g g e s t i o n i s based on the dua l t h e o r i e s t h a t the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for communication l i e s so le ly with the counsel for 
Defendant and t h a t the f a i l u r e to communicate c o n s t i t u t e s 
excusable neg lec t . This i s not supported in law or the r u l e s of 
procedure . 
This a c t i o n was i n s t i t u t e d by the f i l i n g of a c o m p l a i n t 
a g a i n s t t h e D e f e n d a n t on or a b o u t J u l y 8, 1 9 8 6 , w i t h t h e 
Defendant being served immediately t h e r e a f t e r . On or about Ju ly 
1 7 , 1 9 8 6 , D e f e n d a n t f i l e d an a n s w e r and was a t t h a t t i m e 
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r e p r e s e n t e d by Stephen J . Plowman, a t t o r n e y a t l aw. The mot ion 
for summary judgment was f i l ed on or about September 29, 1986. 
The issue of excusable neglec t was never brought before the 
c o u r t , never dec ided by i t , and never proved by the Defendan t . 
P l a i n t i f f does con te s t t h a t i s s u e . 
From J a n u a r y 8, 1986 , t h r o u g h F e b r u a r y 24, 1987 , t h e 
Defendant h i m s e l f had more than s u f f i c i e n t o p p o r t u n i t y to 
i n q u i r e of h i s c o u n s e l or of the c o u r t r e c o r d i t s e l f as to the 
s t a t u s of h i s ca se and to be informed as to the p r o c e d u r e s being 
a p p l i e d . 
Rule 60(b)(1) p r o v i d e s on ly for e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t and not 
any or a l l n e g l e c t . 
The Utah Supreme Court in Gardiner and Gardiner Bu i lde r s vs. 
S wapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982) cons ide rs t h i s s p e c i f i c poin t in 
c o n s t r u i n g Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) . In t h a t case a d e f a u l t judgment was 
entered and Defendant through new counsel a t tempted to se t as ide 
t h a t judgment c l a i m i n g t h a t "he did not know of h i s a t t o r n e y s 
s t i p u l a t i o n to extend the time to answer the d iscovery procedures 
and was not informed t h a t the o r d e r c o m p e l l i n g him to answer 
discovery was issued." The Defendant in the Gardiner case s p e c i -
f i c a l l y c o n t e s t e d the e n t r y by the d i s t r i c t c o u r t of a judgment 
on the argument t h a t " . . . t h e n e g l i g e n c e of h i s a t t o r n e y may not 
be imputed to him under these c i rcumstances ." 
The Utah Supreme Court s u c c i n c t l y responded by s t a t i n g "we do 
not a g r e e . " The c o u r t in i t s r u l i n g r e a f f i r m e d the r u l e t h a t a 
t r i a l cour t has cons ide rab le d i s c r e t i o n in ru l ing on a motion to 
s e t a s i d e a judgment under Rule 60(b) and t h a t the c o u r t would 
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r e v e r s e the t r i a l c o u r t on ly where c l e a r a b u s i v e d i s c r e t i o n i s 
shown. In t h a t c a s e t h e c o u r t d i d n o t f i n d such a b u s i v e 
d i s c r e t i o n . 
Fu r the r , the cour t went on to s t a t e : 
"While Swapp s t a t e s h i s a f f i d a v i t t h a t h i s 
a t to rney never communicated with him concerning 
t h e d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t r e c e i v e d , t h e r e c o r d s 
shows t h a t the f a i l u r e to communicate may not 
have been e n t i r e l y t h e n e g l i g e n c e of t h e 
a t t o r n e y . F u r t h e r , even if the f a c t s s t a t e d In 
the a f f i d a v i t are t r u e , Swapp fa i l ed to con tac t 
h i s a t t o r n e y for one and a ha l f y e a r s a f t e r he 
f i l ed h i s answer and coun te r - c l a im . In Airketn, 
Supra we found n e g l i g e n c e on the p a r t of the 
par ty for such f a i l u r e to communicate." 
P l a i n t i f f , having made every e f f o r t to provide proper no t i ce 
and c o p i e s of p l e a d i n g s to the Defendant and having r e f r a i n e d 
from pursuing the summary judgment for over th ree months, should 
n o t now be p e n a l i z e d fo r t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s own n e g l i g e n c e . 
Al though , the r u l e s and case law do i n d i c a t e t h a t in c e r t a i n 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t may e x i s t , t h a t d o e s n o t 
c o n s t i t u t e an unqual i f ied and absolu te r i g h t to have a judgment 
s e t a s i d e where any n e g l i g e n c e e x i s t s . I t i s a q u a l i f i e d 
p r i v i l e g e and is a t the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l cou r t . P l a i n t i f f 
s u g g e s t t h a t in t he c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e Defendant i s 
r e spons ib l e for h i s own negl igence and cannot now, simply because 
he r e a l i z e s the impac t of a judgment and has been se rved wi th a 
mot ion and o rde r in s u p p l e m e n t a l p r o c e e d i n g s in en fo rcemen t of 
the judgment, seek to se t as ide the judgment and extend the time 
and cos t involved in the prosecu t ion of t h i s case . I t Is simply 
not e q u i t a b l e . 
7. I s sues Not on Appeal. 
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P l a i n t i f f does not b e l i e v e t h a t the i s s u e of n e g l e c t of 
c o u n s e l i s an i s s u e b e f o r e the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t for i t was not 
r a i s e d as a p o i n t by the Defendan t . Nor a r e the m e r i t s of the 
D e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion to s e t a s i d e the summary judgment a t i s s u e 
b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t . The o n l y i s s u e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 
Defendant ' s motion to s e t as ide the summary judgment i s whether 
or not the d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o p e r l y den ied t h a t mot ion for l ack of 
j ur i s d i c t i o n . 
IV. A t t o r n e y ' s Fees and Costs 
P l a i n t i f f r e s p e c t f u l l y r eques t s the award of a t t o r n e y ' s fees 
and cos t s incurred with r e spec t to t h i s appea l . 
CONCLUSION 
P l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s t h a t the Defendant i s not e n t i t l e d to an 
o r d e r from the Utah Court of Appeals s e t t i n g a s i d e the summary 
judgment on e i t h e r the grounds t h a t the d i s t r i c t cour t fa i l ed to 
enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, t ha t the summary 
judgment was i m p r o p e r l y e n t e r e d because of the e x i s t e n c e of 
genuine i s sues of m a t e r i a l f a c t , or the a l leged manifes t e r ro r of 
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t in not r u l i n g upon the D e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion to 
se t as ide the summary judgment. As argued, the P l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s 
t h a t the law does not r e q u i r e the e n t r y of F i n d i n g s of Fac t and 
Conclusions of Law with r e spec t to the summary judgment; t h a t the 
D e f e n d a n t f a i l e d t o f i l e a f f i d a v i t s or r a i s e e v i d e n t i a r y 
q u e s t i o n s to show t h a t t h e r e was a genu ine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l 
f a c t ; and t h a t the Defendant did not c o n t e s t or a l l e g e t h a t the 
a f f i d a v i t of the P l a i n t i f f was i n s u f f i c i e n t for the grant ing of a 
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summary judgmen t , and f i n a l l y t h a t the d i s t r i c t c o u r t l acked 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to g r a n t t he d e f e n s e mot ion and to s e t a s i d e t h e 
summary judgment once the no t i ce of appeal was f i l e d . 
Upon r u l i n g of the f i r s t two p o i n t s of the D e f e n d a n t ' s 
appeal , the Defendant ' s motion to s e t as ide the summary judgment, 
be ing based on the same g r o u n d s , becomes moot as does h i s t h i r d 
p o i n t . 
The summary judgment should be aff i rmed. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of October, 1987. 
JENKINS, MCKEAN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney forPlaintiff-Respondent 
CANTWELL2.BRI 
D. "Cantwell" 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t on t h e . ^ 7 * day of O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 7 , I 
s e rved upon the Defendant four (4) c o p i e s of the fo rego ing BRIEF 
OF RESPONDENT t o J e f f R. T h o r n e , of MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE, 
A t t o r n e y f o r t h e D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t , a t 98 N o r t h Main S t r e e t , 
P.O. Box F, Brigham C i t y , Utah 84302-0906, by U.S. m a i l , p o s t a g e 
p r e p a i d . 
Gary*.0. McKean 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Gary 0. McKean 2201 
JENKINS, McKEAN & ASSOCIATES 
67 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-4107 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THECOUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
CANTV7ELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO., INC. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE 
Defendant ) 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST 
FOR INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 24996 
Plaintiff CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO., INC., by and through 
its undersigned attorney and pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, propounds the following interrogatories to the 
Defendant in the above-entitled action to be answered under oath 
in accordance with said rule: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: 
Please state your name, residential address, business 
address, nature of business or occupation, and name of business 
owned. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 
Z3 
cu 
^ Please state if you are currently, as well as whether you 
^ ^ e t e during the period April 22, 1983, through March 11, 1985, 
en 
Z&i*t<$aged i n a b u s i n e s s k n o w n a s " C r a i g L. C o n s t r u c t i o n " . I f s o , 
CO ^ t 
CD CO . 
Z3 - j g l e a s e s t a t e t h e n a m e s , r e s i d e n t i a l a d d r e s s e s , and i n t e r e s t s o f 
<C i— ' 
L*J 
Q 'A 
UJ 
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a l l o w n e r s , p a r t n e r s , o r s h a r e h o l d e r s o f t h e b u s i n e s s ; w h e t h e r o r 
n o t t h e b u s i n e s s i s o r was a s o l e p r o p r i e t o r s h i p , p a r t n e r s h i p , o r 
c o r p o r a t i o n ; and i f i n c o r p o r a t e d , t h e n a m e s and a d d r e s s e s of i t s 
o f f i c e r s and d i r e c t o r s . 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3 ; 
P l e a s e s t a t e y o u r o c c u p a t i o n o r b u s i n e s s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 
A p r i l 2 2 , 1 9 8 3 , t o M a r c h 1 1 , 1 9 8 5 , a n d t h e n a m e o f a n y b u s i n e s s 
w h i c h y o u o w n e d o r o p e r a t e d o r t h e n a m e a n d a d d r e s s o f a n y 
e m p l o y e r d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d . 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4 ; 
P l e a s e s t a t e t h e n a m e a n d b r a n c h o f a n y b a n k o r s a v i n g s a n d 
l o a n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h whom y o u m a i n t a i n e d c h e c k i n g o r o t h e r 
a c c o u n t s f o r C r a i g L. C o n s t r u c t i o n o r i n y o u r n a m e f o r s a i d 
b u s i n e s s o r s i m i l a r b u s i n e s s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d A p r i l 2 2 , 1 9 8 3 , t o 
March 1 1 , 1 9 8 5 , t o g e t h e r w i t h a c c o u n t n u m b e r s t h e r e o f . 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5 ; 
P l e a s e s t a t e t h e a c c o u n t n u m b e r a n d n a m e o f a n y c h a r g e 
a c c o u n t s o p e n e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d b y y o u i n d i v i d u a l l y , o r d o i n g 
b u s i n e s s a s C r a i g L. C o n s t r u c t i o n o r a n y o t h e r b u s i n e s s w i t h t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s w h i c h w e r e e i t h e r o p e n e d o r m a i n t a i n e d d u r i n g t h e 
p e r i o d A p r i l 2 2 , 1 9 8 3 , t h r o u g h March 1 1 , 1 9 8 5 . 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 : 
P l e a s e s t a t e w h a t d o c u m e n t s a r e i n y o u r p o s s e s s i o n o r i n t h e 
p o s s e s s i o n o f y o u r a t t o r n e y , a g e n t , e m p l o y e e s , o r o t h e r w i s e 
r e g a r d i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n t e r m s o f a l l c h a r g e a c c o u n t w i t h 
2 0 
the Plaintiff including, but not limited to,credit agreements, 
account terms and conditions, use authorization restrictions, or 
correspondence. Please provide photo copies thereof or in the 
alternative state when and where Plaintiff may make copies there-
of. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7; 
Please state all business dealings and relationships you 
have had individually or doing business as Craig L. Construction 
with the building project located at approximately 2150 North 
Main Street (Highway 91) in North Logan, Cache County, Utah and 
with Donald C. Loosle with respect to said building, property and 
project during the period May 22, 1983, to March 11, 1985. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8; 
Please state if you placed any restrictions on the charge 
account with Plaintiff. If so, please specify and provide copies 
of the exact restrictions, the manner, time, and place, in which 
given and to whom given and provide together therewitn copies of 
anyother documentation regarding such restrictions. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9; 
Please state any and all defenses you may claim to this 
action. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: 
Please state the name, address, and telephone number of all 
potential witnesses you may call with respect to this action. 
3 
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INTERROGATORY NO. lit 
Have you, or anyone on your behalf, made any payment or 
payments on account with Plaintiff for which you have not 
received the credit? If so, please state the amount, time, 
place, and person to whom such payment or payments were made 
and attach copies of any receipts. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: 
Have you, or anyone on your behalf, ever notified Plaintiff 
that the account claimed by Plaintiff to be due to it was not in 
fact due to it? If so, please state to v/hom this notification 
was given, when it was given, and how it was given. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: 
Are you indebted to the Plaintiff in any sum whatsoever? If 
so, please state the amount of such indebtedness, what the 
indebtedness was incurred for, and whether ypu intend to pay such 
indebtedness. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: 
Please state whether or not you ever specifically informed 
the Plaintiff that Don Loosle was not authorized to make 
purchases on your account with the Plaintiff during the period 
May 22, 1983, through March 11, 1985. If you claim that such 
notice was given, please provide a copy thereof and state to whom 
the notification was given, when it was given, and in the manner 
in which it was given. 
4 
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Dated August 8, 1986 
y G a r y O. McLean 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e a n d c o r r e c t c o p y o f t h e 
f o r e g o i n g w a s m a i l e d t o S t e p h e n J . P l o w m a n , A t t o r n e y f o r 
D e f e n d a n t , a t 755 S o u t h 200 W e s t , R ichmond ; U t a h 8 4 3 3 3 , by 
d e p o s i t i n g s a i d i t e m w i t h t h e U.S. M a i l , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d and 
a d d r e s s e d as s t a t e d , t h i s 8 th day of Augus t , 1986. 
Woiti iSlwjb 
I ' 
c a n t w e l l . i n t 
d .53 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Gary 0. McKean 2201 
JENKINS, McKEAN & ASSOCIATES 
67 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-4107 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO., INC 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE 
Defendant 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 24996 
P l a i n t i f f , CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO., INC., by and 
t h r o u g h i t s u n d e r s i g n e d a t t o r n e y , p u r s u a n t t o Rule 36, Utdh Rules 
of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , r e q u e s t s t h e D e f e n d a n t , CRAIG L. LOOSLE, 
w i t h i n t h i r t y (30) a f t e r t h e s e r v i c e of t h i s r e q u e s t , t o make t h e 
f o l l o w i n g a d m i s s i o n s f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s a c t i o n o n l y and 
s u b j e c t t o a l l p e r t i n e n t o b j e c t i o n s t o a d m i s s i b i l i t y which may be 
i n t e r p o s e d a t t r i a l : 
1. Tha t you a p p l i e d fo r and opened an open accoun t w i t h t h e 
P l a i n t i f f u n d e r t h e name " C r a i g L o o s l e C o n s t r u c t i o n " , a c c o u n t 
number 1 4 3 4 1 1 , d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d A p r i l 2 2 , 1 9 8 3 , t h r o u g h March 
1 1 , 1 9 8 5 . 
2. T h e r e w e r e no r e s t r i c t i o n s p l a c e d on t h e open a c c o u n t 
w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o who migh t make c h a r g e s on i t . 
Number
 f p lc/OC/0 •P) 
13 
F!L-r AUG3 1335 
S a H S . ALLEN, Clerk 
*v __ £ Deputy 
3. Materials and supplies were purchased and delivered on 
this account to the construction site at approximately 2150 North 
Main Street, North Logan, Utah, during the period April 22, 1983, 
through March 11, 1985, said site being adjacent to the North 
Park Bank of Commerce. 
4. That you have never denied this account or the charges 
against it nor notified the Plaintiff of any disclaimer as to any 
5. Don C. Loosle was authorized to make purchases and 
charges against said account during the period April 22, 1983, 
through March 11, 1985. 
6. That you knew that Don C. Loosle was making charges 
against said account for materials purchased from the Plaintiff 
on said account for the construction project located at 2150 
North Main Street, North Logan, Utah. 
7. That you made no objections to Don C. Loosle charging 
purchases against this account for materials and supplies for the 
construction project at 2150 North Main Street, North Logan, 
Utah, during the period April 22, 1983, through March 11, 1985, 
and never so notified the Plaintiff of any objections thereto. 
8. The total balance owed on the account as of June 27, 
1986, is $18,731.08 representing $11,876.18 of principal and 
$6,854.90 in accrued interest. 
14 
Dated this 8th day of August, 1986 
Gar£ 0.'McKean 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e 
f o r e g o i n g w a s m a i l e d t o S t e p h e n J . P l o w m a n , A t t o r n e y f o r 
D e f e n d a n t , 755 S o u t h 200 W e s t , R i c h m o n d , U t a h 8 4 3 3 3 , b y 
d e p o s i t i n g s a i d i t e m w i t h t h e U.S. Mai l on t h i s 8th day of August , 
1986 . 
c a n t w e l l . r e q 
d .53 j b 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
Stephen J. Plowman 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
755 South 200 West 
Richmond, UT 84333 
Telephone: (801) 258-2458 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO., : 
INC. 
: DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S FIRST BEQUEST FOR 
: ADMISSIONS 
vs. 
: Civil No. 24996 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE 
Defendant. 
Defendant responds to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions 
as follows: 
1. That you applied for and opened an open account with 
the Plaintiff under the name "Craig Loosle Construction", account 
number 143411, during the period April 22, 1983, through March 
11, 1985. 
ANSWER: Denies 
2. There were no restrictions placed on the open account 
with reference to who might make charges on it. 
ANSWER: Admits 
Mi r^^9L?f -(' 
s : 0 5 :33G 
b£TH 3. ALLEN, Del* 
3. Materials and supplies were purchased and delivered 
on this account to the construction site at approximately 2150 
North Main Street, North Logan, Utah, during the period April 22, 
1983, through March 11, 1985, said site being adjacent to the 
North Park Bank of Commerce. 
ANSWER: Admits 
4« That you have never denied this account or the 
charges against it nor notified the Plaintiff of any disclaimer 
as to any of the charges placed against said account. 
ANSWER: Denies 
5. Don C. Loosle was authorized to make purchases and 
charges against said account during the period April 22, 1983, 
through March 11, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admits 
6. That you knew that Don C. Loosle was making charges 
against said account for materials purchased from the Plaintiff 
on said account for the construction project located at 2150 
North Main Street, North Logan, Utah. 
ANSWER: Admits 
7. That you made no objections to Don C. Loosle charging 
purchases against this account for materials and supplies for the 
construction project at 2150 North Main Street, North Logan, 
Utah, during the period April 22, 1983, through March 11, 1985, 
and never so notified the Plaintiff of any objections thereto. 
ANSWER: Admits 
(E-39) 
8. The total balance owed on the account as of June 27, 
1986, is $18,731.08 representing $11,876.18 of principal and 
$6,854.90 in accrued interest. 
ANSWER: Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge concerning 
the balance on said account and therefore denies. 
Dated this M ^ day of September, 1986. 
Stephen J. Plowman 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS to the following, postage prepaid on this H~TH 
day of September, 1986. 
Gary 0. McKean 
Jenkins, McKean & Associates 
67 East 100 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
By ^\ilU'1 -BH44^ 
T e r r i Lynn Hampton / 
J I 
t l h 
f F - ^ m R.17A 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Stephen J. Plowman 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
755 South 200 West 
Richmond, UT 84333 
Telephone: (801) 258-2458 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO., : 
INC. 
: DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST 
: FOR INTERROGATORIES 
vs. 
: Civil No. 24996 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE 
Defendant. 
Defendant answers Plaintiff's first set of 
interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. U_ 
Please state your name, residential address, business 
address, nature of business or occupation, and name of business 
owned. 
ANSWER: K. Craig Loosle. 573 East 1980 North, Logan, 
Utah. Work address is the same. General construction under the 
name of K. Craig Loosle Construction. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2j_ 
Number .Q^WC-7 
!"--- scr D i jDO 
tCTH S. ALIEN, Clerk 
*v - , ^ — Deputy 
Please state if you are currently, as well as whether you 
were during the period April 22, 1983, through March 11, 1985, 
engaged in a business known as "Craig L. Construction11 • If so, 
please state the names, residential addresses, and interests of 
all owners, partners, or shareholders of the business; whether or 
not the business is or was a sole proprietorship, partnership, or 
corporation; and if incorporated, the names and addresses of its 
officers and directors. 
ANSWER: No. The name of the enterprise was K. Craig 
Loosle Construction, a sole proprietorship operated at the 
address indicated above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3j. 
Please state your occupation or business during the 
period April 22, 1983, to March 11, 1985, and the name of any 
business which you owned or operated or the name and address of 
any employer during that period. 
ANSWER: General contracting and a construction employee. 
The name is found in the Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4j_ 
Please state the name and branch of any bank or savings 
and loan association with whom you maintained checking or other 
accounts for Craig L. Construction or in your name for said 
business or similar business during the period April 22, 1983, to 
March 11, 1985, together with account numbers thereof. 
ANSWER: Objected to for lack of relevance. 
(E-42) 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5£ 
Please state the account numbed and name of any charge 
accounts opened and maintained by you individually, or doing 
business as Craig L. Construction or any other business with the 
Plaintiffs which were either opened or maintained during the 
period April 22, 1983, through March 11, 1985. 
ANSWER: Objected to for lack of relevance. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 
Please state what documents are in your possession or in 
the possession of your attorney, agent, employees, or otherwise 
regarding the establishment in terms of all charge account with 
the Plaintiff including, but not limited to, credit agreements, 
account terms and conditions, use authorization restrictions, or 
correspondence. Please provide photo copies thereof or in the 
alternative state when and where Plaintiff may make copies 
thereof. 
ANSWER: The only terms of open account are in 
Plaintiff's possession and were provided as an addendum to the 
Complaint. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1_ 
Please state all business dealings and relationships you 
have had individually or doing business as Craig L. Construction 
with the building project located at approximately 2150 North 
Main Street (Highway 91) in North Logan, Cache County, Utah and 
with Donald C. Loosle with respect to said building, property and 
project during the period May 22, 1983, to March 11, 1985. 
(E-43) 
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ANSWER: The building project was administered by Donald 
C. Loosle who retained me and paid me according to the time I 
spent on the project. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 8j_ 
Please state if you placed any restrictions on the charge 
account with Plaintiff. ~If so, please specify and provide copies 
of the exact restrictions, the manner, time, and place, in which 
given and to whom given and provide together therewith copies of 
any other documentation regarding such restrictions. 
ANSWER: No restrictions were placed on the account. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9^ 
Please state any and all defenses you may claim to this 
action. 
ANSWER: See Defendant's Answer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. JJ3 
Please state the name, address, and telephone number of 
all potential witnesses you may call with respect to this action. 
ANSWER: Donald C. Loosle, 2048 North 1300 East, Logan, Utah 
752-4890. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11; 
Have you, or anyone on your behalf, made any payment or 
payments on account with Plaintiff for which you have not 
received the credit? It so, please state the amount, time, 
place, and person to whom such payment or payments were made and 
attach copies of any receipts. 
ANSWER: No. 
(E-44) 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12; 
Have you, or anyone on your behalf, ever notified 
Plaintiff that the account claimed by Plaintiff to be due to it 
was not in fact due to it? If so, please state to whom this 
notification was given, when it was given, and how it was given. 
ANSWER: Donald C. Loosle had a personal conversation 
with Wayne Cantwell wherein it was made known to Mr. Cantwell 
that certain materials, which are the subject matter of this 
action, were to be purchased and supplied to the project 
described in Interrogatory No. 7 for Donald C. Loosle. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: 
Are you indebted to the Plaintiff in any sum whatsoever? 
If so, please state the amount of such indebtedness, what the 
indebtedness was incurred for, and whether you intend to pay such 
indebtedness. 
ANSWER: Yes, I am indebted to Plaintiff on an account 
with an outstanding balance of $750.00 which I intend to pay. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: 
Please state whether or not you ever specifically 
informed the Plaintiff that Don Loosle was not authorized to make 
purchases on your account with the Plaintiff during, the period 
May 22, 1983, through March 11, 1985. If you claim that such 
notice was given, please provide a copy thereof and state to whom 
the notification was given, when it was given, and in the manner 
in which it was given. 
ANSWER: No specific notice was given to Plaintiff. 
(E-45) 
Date'd this ^ f i- day of September 1986. 
T7T 
Stephen J. Plowman 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST 
FOR INTERROGATORIES to the following, postage prepaid on this 
4/\B~ day c?f September, 1986. 
Gary 0. McK^an 
Jenkins, McLean & Associates 
67 East 100 North 
Logan, UT #4321 
tlh 
By y>i ^W 
Terri Lynn Hampt 
(E-46) vn 
EXHIBIT "E" 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO-. ,' 
Inc. , 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE, 
Defendants ' 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1
 Civil No. 24996 
The plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
accompanied by appropriate affidavits and memorandum. The 
motion was filed October 7, 19 86. Counsel for defendant did 
not respond, he was contacted by the clerk on October 22, again 
on October 23, and on the 29th of October both attorneys agreed 
to hold off pending negotiations. The Court was informed by 
letter that negotiations had failed and to proceed with the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for the defendant was contacted by the clerk on 
January 22, 23, 27, and 28 in request for responses. It is now 
February 2, still no response having been made, the Court sees 
no reason to prolong the matter any further nor have the clerk 
make repeated telephone calls. 
N'u|rnr;-r . ^ W iC- ~/?r 
££-3 127 
8t"fH& AUDI, ( M 
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Page Two 
Therefore, based upon the affidavits and memorandum of 
the plaintiff and no response or opposition having been filed 
by the defendant, the motion is granted. Counsel for plaintiff 
to prepare the appropriate papers. 
Dated this 3': day of February, 19 87. 
BY THE COUE' 
VeNoy Chrastpfxersen 
District^ Judge 
Gary 0 . McK&aiL^.J&Z,Fa&t~ 1 QQ.~North - Logan\ Utah 84321 
S t ephen JL JElawraan — T ^ ^ S o n t t r 2f)0"l7est - r Richmond, Utah 84333 
*Vs 3rd d?y of F^brtnrry * 87 ' 
5iTH 3. ALLEN, Cleric ,, *, 
EXHIBIT "F" 
Gary 0. McKean A2201 
JENKINS, McKEAN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
67 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-4107 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO., INC.,; 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff 
vs. ] 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE, ] 
Defendant ' 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I fivil No. 24996 
Based upon the pleadings filed herein and the court's 
memorandum decision dated February 3, 1987, a summary judgment is 
hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff, CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBERS 
CO., INC., against the Defendant, K. CRAIG LOOSLE, in the sum of 
$19,690.48 representing principal in the amount of $11,876.18 and 
interest accrued as of February 28, 1987, in the amount of 
$7,814.30; in the sum of $84.94 for costs accrued to date; in the 
sum of $ 1.800.00 for Plaintiff's attorneys fees; and for such 
sums in addition thereto as Plaintiff may reasonably incur in 
attorneys fees and costs in enforcing and collecting this judg-
ment and making proof thereof to this court hereafter, together 
with interest on the judgment at the rate of 2% per month from 
February 28, 1987. 
DATED this 24th day of February 
cant/loo.jud d.56 jjb 
(E-49) f r\ 
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EXHIBIT "G" 
ncp:i,'P^ r\!.- w -. . - ~ 
Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #32 50 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO. , 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 24996 
Comes now the defendant, K. Craig Loosle, by and 
through his attorney of record, Jeff R. Thome of the firm 
of Mann, Hadfield and Thorne, and moves the court for an 
order setting aside the "summary judgment" dated February 
24, 1987 and in support of said motion alleges as follows: 
1. Rule 6 0(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states; 
"On motion and upon said terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order or proceeding for the following 
reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect;. 
,;v irer 
~)C/' /'i ' / 
i 
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(7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), 
(2), (3), or (4) , not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken." 
The defendant alleges that pursuant to this rule he is 
entitled to have the summary judgment dated February 24, 
1987 set aside pursuant to_the factual bases alleged in his 
affidavit and in support of this motion the defendant is 
attaching his affidavit and his Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities• 
DATED this JO day of April, 1987. 
£ V / V N £ ^ 
Jeff\j$. Thorne 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the £ i day of April, 1987, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion to Set Aside Summary 
Judgment to Gary 0. McKean, Attorney for Plaintiff, 67 East 
100 North, Logan, Utah 84321. 
Secr^t^iy 
, £^?^A v^. jC^/g^-**- *—J 
CE-51) ^ ~ 
EXHIBIT "H" 
RECEIVED 
ij37 k?R 2 ! D'! I.-25 
CACHE C-JLilVV -.LSr.K 
Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne, #3250 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER CO., ) 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE, ) 
Defendant. ) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 24996 
Comes now the defendant and appeals from the summary 
judgment action entered against him on February 24, 19 87. 
The defendant further alleges that this motion is 
timely made because an Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time 
for Filing Notice of Appeal was granted by the court on or 
about the 20th day of March, 1987, which extended the time 
for filing the appeal up to and including the 23rd day of 
April, 1987. 
The apeal is taken from the "summary judgment" dated 
the 24th day of February, 1987 entered by the First Judicial 
District Court in and for Cache County, State of Utah. 
/,PR,?I 1357 
^jqs ails*) wtf4 ^ g 
This appeal is taken to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah. 
DATED this 21 day of April, 1987. 
)Thorne 
MANN ; "HADFI ELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ,? / day of April, 1987, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to Gary 0. 
McKean, Attorney for Plaintiff, 67 East 100 North, Logan, 
Utah 84321. 
-"i 
£' * ,' 
Secretary 
° >' 
~^/i^^ 
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EXHIBIT "I" 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER 
CO., Inc., 
Plaitniff 
v* 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 24996 
Defendant has filed a Motion to set aside summary judgment 
previously entered in this matter. However, an appeal has been 
taken from that decision on the summary judgment and the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah has filed its notification 
of the notice of that appeal having been filed there. 
Therefore, the Court feels it has no further jurisdiction to 
proceed on the case. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this 20th day of May, 19 87. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ve'Noy /Ch r i s to,f fe rsen 
D i s t r i c t Judlgs 
Gary 0 . McKe4rt..-_67 J I a s t lQO-North - Logan, Utah 84321 
Jeff R. Thorna..- P.0-#-.&wc f*U—»Br4gham C i t y t Utah 84302-0906 
. 20th<W of ... May - , 9 9f~ 
. H I M.LEN. Cleric7 , MAY £01987 ft\ 
btTHS.AUEN.Cte* 
W ~fr. Deoutv 
EXHIBIT "J" 
Gary 0. McKean #2201 
JENKINS, McKEAN & ASSOCIATES 
67 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801)752-4107 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CANTWELL BROTHERS LUMBER 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
K. CRAIG LOOSLE, 
Defendant. 
co-;, INC., ) ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. 24996 
T h i s m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e c o u r t updn t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s 
m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e t h e summary j u d g m e n t p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d in 
t h i s m a t t e r . The c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t has f i l e d a 
n o t i c e of a p p e a l f o r t h e m a t t e r t o be t a k e n on a p p e a l t o t h e 
Supreme C o u r t of t h e S t a t e of Utah and c o n c l u d e s as a m a t t e r of 
l aw t h a t t h i s c o u r t has no f u r t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n t o p r o c e e d in 
t h i s c a s e . 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED t h a t the D e f e n d a n t ' s motion 
to s e t a s i d e summary judgment i s d e n i e d . 
DATED t h i s 8 day of July , 1987. 
/s/ 
VeNoy Christoffersen 
cntw/loo.ord 
d . 62 jjb 
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E X H I B I T " K " 
Rule 52 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
An objection couched in language such as 
"the instruction is not suggested by and is con-
trary to law," or like terms, lacks the specific-
ity required by this rule Morgan v Quailbrook 
Condominium Co , 704 P 2d 573 (Utah 1985) 
—Specificity required. 
An objection to an instruction should be spe-
cific enough to bring to the attention of the 
court all claimed errors in the instructions and 
to give the court an opportunity to correct 
them if the court deems it proper Emplovers' 
Mut Liab Ins Co v Allen Oil Co , 123 Utah 
253, 258 P 2 d 445 (1953) 
Explanation of grounds. 
To appeal the giv ing or the refusal of an in-
struction, a party must properly object to the 
instructions in the trial court and explain its 
grounds, with specificity, for challenging the 
instructions Morgan v Quailbrook Condomin-
ium Co., 704 P 2d 573 (Utah 1985) 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction Ful-
ler v Zinik Sporting Goods Co , 538 P 2d 1036 
(Utah 1975) 
Cited in Wellman v Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P 2d 701 (1961), Hill v Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P 2d 186 (1962), Ortega v Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P 2d 406 (1963), Meier v 
Chnstensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P 2d 734 
(1964), Memmott v United Spates Fuel Co , 22 
Utah 2d 356, 453 P 2d 155 (1969), Telford v 
Newell J Olsen & Sons Constr Co , 25 Utah 
2d 270, 480 P 2d 462 (1971), Flynn v W P 
Harhn Constr Co , 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P 2d 
356 (1973), McGinn v Utah Power & Light 
Co, 529 P 2 d 423 (Utah 19*34) Henderson v 
Meyer, 533 P 2d 290 (Utah 1975), Lamkm v 
Lynch, 600 P 2d 530 (Utah 1979), State v Hall, 
671 P 2d 201 (Utah 1983), Highland Constr 
Co v Union Pac R R , 683 P 2d 1042 (Utah 
1984), Gill v Timm, 720 P 2d 1352 (Utah 
1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75 Am Jur 2d Trial * 573 
et seq 
C . J S . — 88 C J S Trial ^ 266 to 448 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in ci\il case as affected bv the 
manner in which thev are written, 10 A L R 3d 
501 
Sufficient of evidence in personal injurv 
action to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jurv thereon 18 
A L R 3 d 10 
Sufficient of ewdence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac 
ltv and to warrant instructions to jury thereon 
18 A L R 3d 88 
Sufficient of ewdence, in personal injurv 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A L R 3 d 170 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner s unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A L R 3 d 1081 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirabiht> and importance of agree-
ment 38 A L R 3 d 1281 
"Verdict-urging instructions in ciwl case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A L R 3d 845 
Verdict-urgmg instruction» in ciwl case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain fiom intransigence 
or reflecting on mtegritv or intelligence of ju 
rors 41 A L R 3d 1154 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap 
pro\ed jurv instructions 49 A L R 3d 128 
Necessit\ and propnet\ of instructing on al 
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warrantv, where instruction on strict habihtv 
in tort is given in products liability case 52 
A L R 3 d 102 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51 and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury 1 A L R Fed 310 
Key Numbers. — Trial s=» 182 to 296 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
148 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 52 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
merit, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preced- Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
ing "in granting" in the first sentence, inserted Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth 
sentence and added the last sentence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
In presence of court. 
Written. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
—Easement. 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
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EXHIBIT HL" 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
Opening default or default judgment claimed Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
to have been obtained because of attorney's pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, Default judgments against the United States 
1255 °r f l H n g ° f n e C 6 S S a r y P a p e r S ' 2 1 A'L-R'3d under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Failure to give notice of application for de- ^ e d ^ 5* A-L-R- f «?• 1 9 0; 
fault judgment where notice is required only K e y Numbers. - Judgment <*> 92 to 134. 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Rule 56, Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
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Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F R C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Inconsistency with deposition 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits 
Resting on pleadings 
—Sufficiency 
Hearsay and opinion testimony 
—Superseding pleadings 
—Unpleaded defenses 
—Verified pleading 
—Waiver of right to contest 
—When unavailable 
—Who may make 
Affirmative defense 
Answers to interrogatories 
Appeal 
—Standard of review 
Evidence 
—Facts considered 
—Improper evidence 
—Proof 
—Weight of testimony 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact 
—Corporate existence 
—Deeds 
—Lease as security 
Judicial attitude 
Motion to dismiss 
Notice 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect 
Procedural due process. 
Summary judgment 
—Availability. 
—Cross-motions 
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FIFTH DISTRICT 
HON. J. HARLAN BURNS 
ARCHIVES 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Floyd A. Jensen 
Ted D. Smith 
for appellant 
No. 18633 john L. Miles 
J. MacArthur Wright 
for respor>dents 
FTfVright h Miles, Chartered, a 
Utah corporation, J. MacArthur 
Wright, J. Ralph Atkin and John R. 
Miles, 
F I L E D 
A p r i l 2 7 , 1 9 8 4 
Defendants and Respondents. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
HAIL, Chief Justice 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. (Mountain 
Bell) brought this action to recover on a bond given by Atkin, 
Wiight and Miles (the Atkin firn), a St. George law firm, to 
secure a preliminary injunction restraining Mountain Bell from 
placing an intercept on the nam telephone line of the Atkin 
firn. The district court granted surnary judgment for the 
firm, and Mountain Bell appeals. he reverse and remand for 
trial. 
In October, 1980, Mountain Bell distributed the 
Southern Utah telephone directory, *pich includes St. George 
telephone listings, to its custorers. As a result of a printing 
error, the number assigned to the AtKin firm was listed in the 
yellow pages not only for t^ e Atkin fir"1 but also for a com-
peting law firm. As a result, callers attempting to reach the 
competing firm after consulting the yellov pages would reach 
the Atkin firm. Following a protest to Mountain Bell by the 
competing firm, Mountain Bell placed a mechanical intercept on 
the dually listed number. The intercept informed callers of 
the correct number of the competing firm and of the newly 
assigned number for the Atkin firm. The Atkin firm immediately 
secured a temporary restraining order from the district comt 
that required Mountain Bell to remove the intercept and re-
store the original number to the Atkin firm. Mountain Bell 
complied, but petitioned the district couit to have the order 
vacated, contending that the district court did not have juris-
diction over Mountain Bell's disposition of the phone number. 
The judge refused to vacate the order and entered a preliminary 
injunction. To secure the preliminary injunction, the Atkin 
firm posted a $25,000 bond with the individual members of the 
firm as sureties. Mountain Bell then applied to this Court for 
an extraordinary writ to vacate the injunction or, alterna-
tively, for interlocutory appeal, the application was denied. 
The competing firm thereupon filed A petition with 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting relief. Follow-
ing a hearing before the PSC at which the competing firm, the 
Atkin firm and Mountain Bell were represented, the PSC ordered 
Mountain Bell to place a live operator intercept on the dually 
assigned line to direct callers to the proper numbers for the 
law firm being called. The PSC order tequired the Atkin firm's 
phone number to be changed. Mountain Bell requested the 
district court to vacate the injunction to allow it to coriDly 
wien the PSt order. The district court refused, and Mountain 
Bell petitioned this Court for an extraordinary writ to require 
the district judge to dissolve the injunction or, in the 
alternative, to require the PSC to \acate its order. The Court 
vacated the injunction of the district court and permitted the 
damage action filed by the Atkin firm against Mountain Bell to 
go forward. 
On March 5, 1981, Mountain Bell filed a notice of 
claim on bond in the damage action then pending in the district 
court. On Tebruary 16, 1982, Mountain Bell filed this action 
in the district court to recover on the bond, claiming attorney 
fees and costs paid by the company to secure relief from the 
injunction. The district court granted sjmmary judgment in 
favor of the Atkin firm. On appeal, Mountain Bell seeks 
reversal of the summary judgment and remand for trial. 
The Atkin firm contenas that since Mountain Bell did 
not file affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, the summary judgment rust be affirmed. However, 
under Rule 56, Utah R. Ci\. P., it is not always required that 
the party opposing summary judement proffer affidavits in order 
to avoid judgment against him. As this Court has said 
Rule 56(e) states specifically that a 
response in opposition to a motion must be 
supported by affidavits or other documents 
only in order to demonstrate that there is 
a genuine issue of fact for trial. Hhere 
the party opposed to the notion submits no 
documents in opposition, the moving party 
nay be granted sumrary judgment only "if 
appropriate," that is, if he is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law,. [Citation 
onit ted. ) 
Therefore, under Rulr 5G(c), Iti'i R. Civ. P., sunmpry 
judgment can be granted only if the record shows that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doubts, 
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be 
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing 
V. Olwell v. Clark, Utah, 658 P.2d 585 (1982). 
2. Id. at 586. 
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sunnary judgment.0 Litigants must be able to present their 
cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered 
against then unless it is obvious from the evidence before the 
court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right 
to recovery. The trial court nust not weigh evidence or 
assess credibility. 
In this case, the order granting sunnary judgment for 
the Atkin firm contains findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
«EI^M^m\'*ir|r^ lWM»Mrg"«*l _ 
the trial judge saw fit to nake and enter findings and con-
clusions, the content of which evidence the existence of 
naterial issues of fact. Therefore, the grant of sunnary 
judgment is precluded. 
The trial judge found, anong other things, that there 
was no evidence of wrongful restraint. This conclusion is 
incorrect. 
Rule 65A(c), Utah R. Civ. P., provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, no 
restraining order or preliminary injunc-
tion shall issue except upon the giving of 
Security by the applicant, in such sun as 
the court deens proper, for the payment of 
Such costs and danages as may be incurred 
j§ or suffered by any party who is found to 
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 
(Emphasis added.J 
If the restraining or enjoinder is not wrongful, the 
party enjoined has no basis for recovery on the bond. If, 
however, it is found that the injunction was wrongfully issued, 
the enjoined party has an action for costs and damages incurred 
as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. These damages 
are limited to the amount of the bond where the injunction was 
obtained in good faith and maij include the attorney fees of 
the party wrongfully enjoined. 
Tl Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d ~ 
1333 (1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434 (1982). 
4. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 
413 P.2d 807 (1966). 
5. W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., Utah, 627 
P.2d 56 (1981). 
6
* §££• ^^gj.. Tracy v. Capozzi, Nev. , 642 P.2d 591 (1982); 
Egge v. Lane County, 276 Or. 889, 556 P.2d 1372 (1976). 
7. Coggins v. Wright, 22 Ariz. App. 217, 526 P.2d 741 (1974); 
Unity Light ft Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 
445 P.2d 720 (1968); Shultz v. Pascoe, 94 N.M. 634, 614 P.2d 
1083 (1980). 
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It is no defense to an action on an injunction bond 
that the injunction was sought in good faith since malicious
 fl 
prosecution is not a prerequisite for recovery upon the bond. 
"Wrongful" does not necessarily connote bad faith or conniv-
ance.' An injunction is wrongfully issued and recovery on the 
bond is permissible if it is finally determined that the 
applicant was not entitled to the injunction. 
In this case, the Atkin firm was not entitled to an 
injunction issued by the district court since the district 
court had no jurisdiction over complaints regarding Mountain 
Bell service. 
The legislature has given the PSC broad powers and 
jurisdiction over matters concerning public utilities: 
The commission is hereby vested with power 
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate 
every public utility in this state, and to 
supervise all of the business of every such 
public utility in this state, and to do all 
things, whether herein specifically desig-
nated or in addition thereto, which are 
necessary or convenient in the exercise of 
such power and jurisdiction . . . . 
[Emphasis added.] 
U.C.A., 1953, « 54-7-16 further provides: 
No court of this state (except the Supreme 
Court to the extent herein specified) shall 
have jurisdiction to review, reverse, 
correct or annul any order or decision of 
the commission, or to suspend or delay the 
execution or operation thereof, or to 
enjoin, restrain or interfere with the 
commission in the performance of its 
official duties . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
This Court has interpreted that Act to mean that the 
PSC has primary exclusive jurisdiction to determine the rights 
ST Monroe Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. De Bar!, 
562 F.2d 30 (10th Cir. 1977); Rocky Mountain Timber Corp. v. 
Federal Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 433 (D. Or. 1980); Edwards v. 
Container Kraft Carton & Paper Supply Co., 161 Cal. App. 2d 
752, 327 P.2d 622 (1958). 
9
« See» e.g., Roy v. Union Bank, La. App., 347 So. 2d 286 
(1977). 
10. Aetna Cas. % Sur. Co. v. Bell, 95 Nev. 822, 603 P.2d 692 
(1979); Kennedy v. Wackenhut Corp., 41 Or. App. 275, 599 P.2d 
1126 (1979). 
11. U.C.A., 1953, $ 54-4-1. 
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and obligations between utilities and consumers. 
Other states have also interpreted their public 
utility acts as conferring exclusive prinary jurisdiction on 
the state public service administrative body to deal with ques 
tions of adequate service. For example, the Iowa Supreme 
Court, holding that the Iowa Commerce Commission had exclusive 
jurisdiction in a telephone service case, said 
Virtually all authorities hold when author-
ity is delegated to an administrative offi-
cer or body, such delegation within its 
terms and limitations is primary and exclu-
sive unless a contrary intent is clearly 
manifested by the legislature . . . . 
Until the Commission has made its finding 
and has entered its order so that an appeal 
may be taken . • . the jurisdiction of the 
Commission is exclusive. [Emphasis 
added.) 
The sole question then in this case is whether 
changing a phone number falls within the purview of the PSC. 
We hold that it does. 
Teiepnone nurbers are specifically regulated by a 
tariff promulgated b> the PSC that states 
The subscriber has no property right in the 
telephone number nor any right to continu-
ance of service through any particular 
central office, and the telephone company 
may change the telephone number or central 
office designation of a subscriber whenever 
it considers it desirable in the conduct 
of its business. 
TT. North Salt lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co., 
118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577 (1950), Pro\o City v. Department 
of Business Regulation, 118 Utah 1, 218 P.2d 675 (1950). 
*3* See» p,g'. Robinson Ins. & Real Estate, Inc. v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 366 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Ark. 1973), 
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Hawkeye State Tel. Co., Iowa, 
165 N.\\.2d 771 (1969), Demson hut. Tel. Co. v. Kendall, 195 
Kan. 227, 403 P.2d 1011 (1965), State ex rel. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. District Court, 160 Mont. 443, 503 P.2d 526 
(1972) Continental Tel. Co. v. Hunter, Okla., 590 P.2d 667 
(1979), Allen v. General Tel. Co., 20 Wash. App. 144, 578 P.2d 
1333 (1978). See also Grever v. Idaho Tel. Co., 94 Idaho 900, 
499 P.2d 1256 (1972). 
14. Elk Run Tel. Co. v. General Tel. Co., Iowa, 160 N.W.2d 
311 (1968). 
15. 16^ at 315. 
16. General Regulations, sec. 20, no. N-2. 
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Courts have consistently held that tariffs have the 
force of law and that customers do notghave a property 
right in a particular telephone number. Therefore, absent a 
contract to the contrary, the Atkin firm had no right to any 
particular phone number and Mountain Bell had the right to 
change the Atkin firm's number without interference from the 
district court if the company felt that it was "desirable in 
the conduct of its business." 
It is clear under the circumstances of this case that 
Mountain.Bell did not change the Atkin firm's number arbi-
trarily, but did so in furtherance of adequate telephone 
service to all of its subscribers, including both the Atkin firm 
and the competing firm. Further, all tariffs promulgated by 
the PSC, including the one above cited, were incorporated into 
the equipment lease agreement between Mountain Bell and the 
Atkin firm. Finally, there was no contract between Mountain 
Bell and the Atkin firm that gives the firm the right to any 
particular phone number. Therefore, under the Public Utility 
Act and the applicable tariffs, the district court had no juris-
diction to issue an injunction to restore the Atkin firm's phone 
number. 
The Atkin firm contends that the fact that this Court 
refused to dissolve the injunction upon interlocutory appeal 
is evidence that the injunction was not wrongful. This con-
tention has no merit. The denial of a petition for inter-
locutory appeal does noUnecessanlj constitute a ruling on the 
merits of the petition. It may constitute a decision to defer 
ruling on thepCierits to permit a more comprehensive treatment 
subsequently. 
In this case, the Court dealt with the merits of the 
injunction once the case had been heard b> the proper forum, 
the PSC, and ruled on b> that body. Presented with the proper-
ly constituted order from the agenc> with primaiy jurisdiction, 
this Court dissolved the district court injunction in favor 
of the PSC order. This dissolution is conclusive evidence JjUat 
the injunction by the district court was wrongfully issued. 
The Atkin firm, however, claims that even if the pre-
liminary injunction was wrongful, Mountain Bell is precluded 
17. Shehi v. Southwestern Bell lei. Co., 382 F.2d 627 (10th 
Cir. 1967) First Central Service Corp. v. Mountain Bell Tel., 
95 N.M. 509, 623 P.2d 1023 (1981). 
***. See, e.g. Shehi , supra note 17. 
19. Clayton Home Equipment Co. v. Florida Tel. Corp., Fla., 
152 So. 2d 203 (1963) (a telephone company has the right to 
change phone numbers as long as the decision is not arbitrary). 
2
^* Cf» Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
Comm'n, Utah, 602 P.2d 696 (1979). 
21. 16^ at 699. 
22
-
 see, e.g., A>er v. General Dynamics Corp., 128 Ariz. 324, 
625 P.2d 913 (1980). 
No. 18633 -6-
fron maintaining an action on the bond separate from the firm's 
court action against Mountain Bell. The Atkin firn alleges 
that Mountain Bell elected to nake a denand on the bond in the 
damages lawsuit by filing a notion for such relief. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c) provides that the liability of 
a surety on an injunction bond "nay be enforced on notion with-
out the necessity of an independent action." (Emphasis added.) 
This language does not preclude a separate action on an injunc-
tion bond. On the contrary, rather than requiring a separate 
action on a bond as was the case prior to the adoption of the 
current Rule 65A(c), it allows an action on the bond to be 
enforced in the action in which it is filed at the option of 
the enjoined party. 
On March 5-, 1981, Mountain Bell filed a notice of 
claim on bond with the district court. That notice gave no 
indication that Mountain Bell was commencing action on the bond 
as part of the tort lawsuit. To the contrary, it simply stated 
that Mountain Bell intended to assert at some future time its 
claim on the bond. While the notice was not the most unam-
biguous means of preserving Mountain Bell's right to bring an 
action on the bond, it cannot be deemed to have been a demand 
on the bond upon which Mountain Bell failed to take action. 
Thus the company was not precluded from pursuing a separate 
action. 
Finally, the Atkin firm contends that this Court 
should dismiss Mountain Bell's appeal because Mountain Bell 
failed to file an appeal bond as required by Rule 73(c), Utah g, 
Civ. P. Failure to file an appeal bond is not jurisdictional, 
although it may be grounds2for dismissal of an appeal in 
appropriate circumstances. However, this Court has discre-
tion to allow the bond to be filed subsequent to the_procedural 
time where no prejudice is shown to the respondent. In this 
case, it would be appropriate to permit a subsequent filing; 
however, given the disposition of the case, respondent is not 
prejudiced and no purpose would be served by requiring current 
tender of an appeal bond. 
The judgment of the district court is vacated and set 
aside, and the case is remanded for trial. 
22k Junction Irrigation Co. v. Snow, 101 Utah 71, 118 P.2d l30 
(1941). 
24. Fillmore City v. Reeve, Utah, 571 P.2d 1316 (1977). 
25
' §e£, e.g., Neal v. Green, 68 Wash. 2d 415, 413 P.2d 339 
(1966). 
26. See, e.g., Powers v. Citizens Union Nat'1 Bank & Trust 
Co., 329 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964) (decided under former Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 73). 
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 supra notes 25 and 26. 
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tfE CONCUR-
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Dallin H. Oaks, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
HOVE, Justice: (Dissenting) 
I dissent. I think the conclusion is inescapable 
that Mountain Bell effectively elected to make a demand on 
the bond in the prior action brought by the Atkin firm for 
damages. On March 5, 1981, Mountain Bell filed a Notice of 
Claim on Bond with the district court in the prior action. 
The Notice bore the caption of the prior action. In the 
notice, Mountain Bell stated that "[p]roof of the specific 
amount of damages will be filed in the future . . ." and warned 
the Atkin firm and the court not to allow the bond to be with-
drawn. If Mountain Bell did not intend to elect to pursue 
the bond in that action, then it would seem that the filing 
was wholly unnecessary. At least, it should have contained 
some reference to an independent action that would be insti-
tuted later. Mountain Bell made its filing of the prior action 
months before the trial, allowing it ample time to pursue the 
bond in that action. 
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